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Abstract—Aim of this paper is to present the challenges and 
developments of the Albanian insurance market during the 
process of its liberalization. Consequently the insurance market 
has shown instability with regard to the fluctuations of the 
premium levels. A fair pricing based on the market conditions 
is one of the biggest challenges of the albanian insurance 
market. By means of an econometric model, the correlation 
between the liberalization process and profitability of insurance 
companies has been shown. This paper discusses also the 
efficiency of the Bonus-Malus System, which is expected to be 
implemented in Albania in 2018 in order to stabilize the 
insurance market. In this regard the elasticity according to 
Loimaranta (1972) is calculated for Albania. As the Bonus-
Malus System is already implemented in other region 
countries, the paper suggests that in addition to the advantages 
this system can bring, there is also the risk of the phenomenon 
known in the literature as “ Hunger for Bonus”, according to 
which, people tend to not report the claims. Under such 
conditions the result would be a lower claim frequency 
deriving from the non-reporting of claims and not from the 
implementation of the Bonus-Malus System. The 
implementation of the Bonus-Malus system must be 
accompanied by an increase of anti-fraud measures.  
 
Keywords— Liberalization, MTPL Insurance, Bonus-Malus 
System, Efficiency of Bonus-Malus, Markov Transition 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In August 2011 Albania liberalized the premium tariffs for 
the MTPL insurance, which represents the main business line 
in Albania. Since then, mandatory motor insurance premiums 
have undergone constant fluctuations. The process of 
liberalization supports the competitiveness, but it can lead to 
market failures and distortions, if this liberalization is 
premature. The Albanian Financial Supervisory Authority has 
taken different measures to contribute to the stabilization of the 
insurance market. The introduction of the Bonus-Malus system 
is intended to stabilize the market. It is expected to be 
implemented  in 2018, therefore we analyze in the paper the 
effectiveness of this system for the Albanian case, by 
calculating its elasticity.  
II. LIBERALIZATION OF INSURANCE MARKET IN ALBANIA, 
AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF INSURANCE 
LIBERALIZATION ON PROFITABILITY OF INSURANCE 
COMPANIES   
Discussions on the liberalization of the insurance market in 
Albania are currently focusing on the liberalization of the 
MTPL premium tariffs. This is a further step towards the 
liberalization process of the Albanian insurance market, which 
began in 1999 with the approval of some amendments to law 
8081, dated 07.03.1996 “On insurance and reinsurance 
activities”. The law no. 8458, dated 11.02.1999 enabled the 
introduction of private insurance companies with domestic or 
foreign capital. As a consequence, Sigma was licensed on 
03.02.1999, Intersig on 13.09.2001, Interalbanian on 
10.09.2004, Albsig on 10.09.2004, Eurosig, Sigal Life and 
Sicred on 10.09.2004. (AMF, 2006). Starting from 2006 also 
foreign companies started to show interes in the Albanian 
insurance sector. With the further development of the insurance 
market, the insurance laws have undergone further changes and 
currently the activity and supervision of insurance companies is 
regulated by law no.52, dated 22.05.2014 “On the activity of 
insurance and reinsurance”. 
It is well known that liberalization in general promotes 
competitiveness and improves the quality of products in favor 
of the consumer. Social welfare can be supported by perfect 
competition of markets. (Samuelson, 1965). The discussions 
about liberalization give rise also to discussions on regulation. 
This lies in the fact that a competitive model assumes that 
information is perfect for both, byers and sellers. Nevertheless 
insurance is a compex business, where the existence of 
assymetric information is inevitable. In some cases, the 
customer has more information than the insurer and sometimes 
the opposite is true. For example, the seller has more 
information regarding the financial soundness of the company. 
It is the information assymetrie that justifies the market 
intervention through regulation. Insurers and their 
representatives have fewer incentives to be transparent as their 
sales can be affected, so that regulators aim at establishing 
balances between the insured and the insurers by monitoring 
the financial soundness of the companies in order to protect the 
consumer. (OECD, 2000). Empirical evidence shows a positive 
correlation between the openness of the insurance market, its 
liberalization and competitiveness through productivity 
improvements. (OECD, 2000).     Patris Poshnjari: University of Tirana, patris.poshnjari@gmail.com 
 
 
 International Journal of Business, Economics and Management Works                       Vol. 4, Issue 11, PP. 39-49, November 2017                                                            
                        ISSN: 2410-3500 
The competition in the Albanian insurance market has 
intensified and is harsh considering the fact that the main 
business line for all companies is the compulsory motor 
insurance. Competitiveness is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index, which is calculated as the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of each insurance company, 
according to the formula below: 
                Herfindahl=

n
i
is
1
2
,                                        (1) 
where s represents the market share of each insurance 
company, i is the number of insurance companies, which takes 
values from 1 to n, depending on the number of companies 
operating in the market. The highest value that this indicator 
can receive is 10,000 indicating a lack of competitiveness as 
well as a concentration of insurance activity in the hands of just 
one company. The lower the value of this index, the higher is 
the competitiveness. For example, in 1999 INSIG (Non-Life) 
accounted for 92.33 % of the market, Sigma 5.85%, Sigal 
1.62% and INSIG (Life) 0.20%. (AMS, Annual Statistical 
Report, 2005). As a result, the author’s calculations show a 
high index of 8561. Compared to January-June 2017, based on 
the market shares for non-life insurance companies as shown in 
figure 1, the calculations according to formula 1 show a 
Herfindahl index of 1581.65, indicating a decrease in the 
concentration of companies. 
 
Figure I: Market Shares of Non-Life Insurance Companies, as of January-June 
2017 
Source: AMF, Statistical Report on the Insurance Market: www.amf.gov.al 
The table below shows the results of the Herfindahl-Index 
and the Albanian insurance market concentration for the period 
2006-2017. 
 
 
 
 
Table I: Herfindahl index and Concentration Rate 
Companies/years 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Herfindahl Index 1635.785 1598.838 1671.518 1364.546 1593.879 1310.439 1465.078 1323.133 1382.249 1242.615 1303.423606 1338
Companies/years 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
Sigal Uniqa Group Austria 27.86 27.41 28.71 28.85 34.52 30.33 32.85 30.71 29.71 27.16 27.8 28
Eurosig 15.74 15.63 15.21 12.75 12.72 10.07 8.44 6.28 5.48 4.53 5.16 3
SIVIG 15.21 14.46 16.36 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Intersig 12.15 11.13 12.04 12.76 10.85 9.18 9.46 9.86 12.49 7.64 5.543 8
Albsig 11.2 12.09 9.91 9.71 8.31 8.62 7.98 7.44 7.3 7.96 6.903 6
INSIG 6.87 6.67 5.84 6.22 5.24 7.54 8.13 8.41 12.49 15.14 16.282 18
Atlantik 5.69 6.53 6.13 6.52 5.12 8.29 9.77 10.83 10.21 11.52 12.668 11
Ansig 5.28 6.08 5.78 5.6 0 2.23 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sigma n.a n.a n.a 7.97 8.95 11.87 13.27 15.39 14.75 15.46 17.75 18
Interalbanian Vienna Ins n.a n.a n.a 6.04 9.05 11.86 10.1 11.09 11.35 10.55 7.892 7
Herfindahl Index 1635.79 1598.84 1671.52 1364.55 1593.88 1310.44 1465.08 1323.13 1382.25 1241.85 1303.42 1338.00
Concentration Rate 70.96 69.59 72.32 64.07 67.14 64.13 65.99 68.02 69.44 69.28 74.5 75 
Source: Authors Calculations 
Concerning the Albanian insurance market, similar 
calculations have been undertaken by Sharku /Shehu (2016), 
who analyze the development of the Albanian insurance 
market structure and estimate these indicators for some of the 
Western Balkan countries. 
We use the Herfindahl Index in the econometric model as a 
dependent variable expressing the market liberalization. Main 
purpose of the econometric model presented in this paper is to 
show the effect of insurance market liberalization on the 
company's profitability. We have selected the return on the 
assets of non-life insurance companies (ROA), as indipended 
variable, which is calculated as the ratio of net financial result 
to the total of assets. We have considered a number of 
observations equal to 11 for a period including the years 2006-
2016. Based on the data obtained from AFSA’s1 Supervision 
Reports over the years 2006 to 2016, we calculate the Return 
on Assets (ROA) for Non-Life insurance companies. The 
results are shown in the table below: 
Table II: ROA of Albanian Insurance Companies (in %) 
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
ROA 2.87 6.68 4.66 2.52 5.26 -2.58 2.76 -4.4 2.82 1.6 1.58  
Source: Author’s calculations based on Supervision Reports of AFSA 
The OLS methodology is used for the solution of the 
multivariable regression. The Herfindahl-Hirschman 
liberalization index (HHDI) as well as the shares of foreign 
capital to the total capital are considered as indipendent 
variables that can explain the fluctuations in the profitability of 
the insurance companies. Through the increase of foreign 
capital during the process of liberalization there can be noticed 
a productivity increase as result of the modern technology and 
the know-how that foreigner bring in Albania. Under these 
circumstances, we think that the correlation between domestic 
                                                          
1
 AFSA is the Abbreviation of Albanian Financial Supervisory Authority, 
which supervises and regulates the Albanian insurance market. Besides, it 
regulates and supervises also the investment and pension funds  sector. 
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capital to the total capital and the profitability of companies 
will be negative, while the correlation between the foreign 
capital to the total of capital and the profitability would be 
positive. 
CR, indicating the concentration rate is another 
independent variable used in the model. This coefficient shows 
the market share in terms of the overall gross written premium, 
of the four biggest insurance companies in Albania. The higher 
this indicator, the higher is also the concentration rate. 
Model results are shown below: 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample: 2006 2016   
Included observations: 11   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic    Prob.   
     
     
C 10.02041 18.25458 0.548926 0.6001 
HHDI -2.014779 0.698191 -2.885715 0.0235 
CR 0.408058 0.200367 2.036556 0.0811 
DC -0.121298 0.156233 -0.776395 0.4629 
     
     
R-squared 0.658456    Mean dependent var 2.160909 
Adjusted R-squared 0.512079    S.D. dependent var 3.222901 
S.E. of regression 2.251238    Akaike info criterion 4.736126 
Sum squared resid 35.47652    Schwarz criterion 4.880815 
Log likelihood -22.04869    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.644919 
F-statistic 4.498380    Durbin-Watson stat 2.087392 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.046418    
     
     
     
Source: Author’s calculations based on E-Views 
The table above shows that about 65% of the changes in the 
profitability of the insurance companies can be explained by 
the liberalization (HHDI), the concentrations rate (CR) and the 
share of domestic capital to total capital (Dc). The Herfindahl 
index is statistically significant, since the probability value of 
this indicator is 0.02, thus less than 5%. However, all indicators 
jointly explain the changes in profitability and this interaction 
is statistically significant with a probability of 0.04. It is 
obvious that the link between profitability and the Herfindahl 
coefficient is negative, hence the higher the Herfindahl 
coefficient, the lower the competition and the lower the 
profitability. Even the relationship between DC and 
profitability (ROA) is negative, as the greater the Albanian 
capital, the lower the profitability. 
The share of foreign capital in Albania has increased over 
the years 2006-2016 from 33% in 2006 to 47.29% in 2016. 
Foreign capital in Albania is dominated by the Austrian capital. 
If we put the share of foreign capital to the total capital as 
an element explaining profitability, then the link between the 
share of foreign capital (FC) and profitability should be 
positive. This is confirmed by the model as follows: 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample: 2006 2016   
Included observations: 11   
     
     
Variable 
Coefficien
t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -2.126172 14.93121 -0.142398 0.8908 
FC 0.121503 0.156108 0.778328 0.4619 
HHDI -2.015226 0.697715 -2.888324 0.0234 
CR 0.408273 0.200367 2.037627 0.0810 
     
     
R-squared 0.658591    Mean dependent var 2.160909 
Adjusted R-squared 0.512272    S.D. dependent var 3.222901 
S.E. of regression 2.250794    Akaike info criterion 4.735730 
Sum squared resid 35.46251    Schwarz criterion 4.880420 
Log likelihood -22.04652    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.644524 
F-statistic 4.501080    Durbin-Watson stat 2.086954 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.046357    
     
 
 
         
 
    
To prove that the model is a good model, a residual 
diagnosis is also undertaken, where among others the model 
should have a high value of correlation (over 60%), the model 
should not show heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of 
residuals, which should have also a normal distribution. In 
order to ascertain whether there is a serial correlation, the 
Breusch Godfrey Serial Correlation Test (LM) test was 
developed, where the results below show that hypothesis 0 can 
not be rejected, so that the residuals do not have serial 
correlation. 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.094270    Prob. F(2,5) 0.9116 
Obs*R-squared 0.399716    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8188 
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Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
   
Sample: 2006 2016   
Included observations: 11   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -4.003366 24.12029 -0.165975 0.8747 
HHDI 0.190551 0.932561 0.204331 0.8462 
CR 0.010518 0.240794 0.043680 0.9669 
DC 0.009137 0.183576 0.049772 0.9622 
RESID(-1) -0.223947 0.529072 -0.423283 0.6897 
RESID(-2) 0.031551 0.536990 0.058756 0.9554 
     
     
R-squared 0.036338    Mean dependent var -3.24E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.927324    S.D. dependent var 1.883521 
S.E. of regression 2.614857    Akaike info criterion 5.062747 
Sum squared resid 34.18738    Schwarz criterion 5.279781 
Log likelihood -21.84511    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.925938 
F-statistic 0.037708    Durbin-Watson stat 1.817403 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.998685    
     
     
 
 
    
To see if the model has heteroskedasticity, again by means 
of the Breusch Pagan Godfrey test, we prove that hypothesis 0 
which states that the model has no heteroskedactivity, can not 
be rejected because the probability value is greater than 5% (P-
value is 0.68 thus more than 5%). A normal distribution of 
residuals is desirable for a good model. In this regard the 
Jarque Bera test, shows that the probability value is greater 
than 5%, so that hypothesis 0 is accepted, meaning a normal 
distributuon of residuals. 
0
1
2
3
4
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Series: Residuals
Sample 2006 2016
Observations 11
Mean      -3.24e-15
Median   0.514647
Maximum  2.257524
Minimum -2.670012
Std. Dev.   1.883521
Skewness  -0.473496
Kurtosis   1.762014
Jarque-Bera  1.113477
Probability  0.573075
 
The results of the model are more in support of the 
efficiency theory than of the hypothesis known as Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP), developed by Mason (1939) and 
Bain (1951), according to which the high profitability of the 
market is related to anticompetitive behavior and a high 
concentration rate. (Njegomir et al (2011).  
Studies conducted by Pope / Ma (2008) on the application 
of the SCP model to 23 states for the period 1996-2003 support 
the SCP hypothesis for low levels of liberalization, but with the 
further increase of liberalization, the presence of foreign capital 
providers increases, changing significantly the dynamic of the 
non-life insurance market. Njegomir et al. (2011) find an 
application of the SCP hypothesis in their analysis regarding 
the insurance market in the former Yugoslavia for the period 
2004-2008. Similar research was undertaken by 
Pervan/Kramaric (2012) for the Croatian insurance market. 
These authors have also considered GDP, the annual inflation 
rate and the market shares of the companies as independent 
variables, and they find a positive correlation between the 
Herfindahl Index and the profitability of companies, supporting 
the SCP hypothesis. Although the insurance market has made 
progress, driven by competition, again the indicators of the 
development of this market remain still at a low level in 
Albania compared to the countries of the region. The main 
indicators that show the development of the insurance market 
are: premium per capita, penetration rate, compulsory motor 
insurance share to the total of gross written premiums, and the 
share of life insurance to the total market. 
 
Penetration rate during 2008-2016 is presented in the 
following table for some Central and Eastern European 
countries: 
 
Penetration rate (% to GDP)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Albania 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.67 0.63 0.83 0.98 1.03
Bosnia and Hercegovina 1.81 1.89 1.9 1.89 1.93 1.97 2.06 2.08 2.16
Bulgaria 2.54 2.38 2.26 2.06 1.96 2.1 2.12 2.22 2.21
Croatia 2.78 2.84 2.82 2.75 2.74 2.75 2.61 2.61 2.55
Czech Republic 3.48 3.68 3.95 3.86 2.8 2.78 2.67 2.55 2.51
Estonia 2.13 2.22 2.01 1.72 1.65 1.68 1.73 1.78 1.86
Hungary 3.31 3.15 3.13 2.91 2.65 2.66 2.57 2.46 2.5
Kosovo 1.45 1.66 1.62 1.62 1.61 1.45 1.44 1.36 1.34
Latvia 2.06 1.95 1.8 1.95 2.04 2.07 2.19 2.18 2.13
Lithuania 1.76 1.66 1.61 1.58 1.55 1.61 1.64 1.73 1.84
Republic of Macedonia 1.55 1.49 1.48 1.47 1.5 1.43 1.45 1.48 1.44
Montenegro 1.96 2.2 2 2 2.1 2.16 2.09 2.12 2.15
Poland 4.64 3.77 3.77 3.68 3.84 3.49 3.19 3.05 3.04
Romania 1.7 1.74 1.56 1.38 1.38 1.25 1.17 1.2 1.24
Serbia 1.9 1.86 1.84 1.68 1.71 1.65 1.78 2 2.12
Slovakia 3.08 3.11 3 2.91 2.8 2.81 2.77 2.57 2.45
Slovenia 5.34 5.73 5.78 5.67 5.71 5.51 5.19 5.19 5.11
CEE 3.31 3.14 3.15 3 2.9 2.74 2.59 2.52 2.5
Source: XPRIMM, Insurance Report, 2015; Insurance Report, 2016  
In addition to economic development, the European 
integration process can also be an important factor in the 
positive performance of the insurance market. During their 
empirical analysis Kozarević/Peressin/Valentinuz (2013), find 
a positive link between the European integration process for 
Western Balkan countries and the development of the 
insurance market. Compared to the countries of the region, in 
Europe the penetration rate in 2015 was about 7.4%, ranging 
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from 0.2% in Iceland and Latvia to 9.3% in Finland. (Insurance 
Europe, 2016). 
III. LIBERALIZATION OF COMPULSORY INSURANCE 
MARKET TARIFFS IN ALBANIA, REGION COUNTRIES AND 
EUROPE 
In Albania, the  Compulsory Motor Insurance entered into 
force for the first time on 1.1.1993 by Law no. 7641, dated 
1.12.1992 "On approval with several amendments to the decree 
no. 295, dated 15.9.1992" On Compulsory motor Third Party 
Liability", now out of force. 
Motor insurance is the main business line not only in 
Albania, but also in the region and Europe. The table below 
shows the share of the motor insurance class to the gross 
written premiums in Albania and some Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
2016 2015 2016 2015
EURO (in Mio.) EURO (in Mio.) % % %
Albania 70.32 61.74 13.89 61.56 60.17
Bosnia and Hercegovina163.18 148.61 9.81 50.34 48.78
Bulgaria 317.49 301.77 5.21 30.28 30.05
Croatia 270.28 275.26 -1.81 23.32 24.09
Czech Republic 777.36 757.48 2.62 17.72 17.64
Estland 79 71.02 11.24 20.36 19.66
Hungary 422.75 307.62 37.42 14.84 11.53
Kosovo 52.4 53.31 -1.7 62.5 65.43
Latvia 53.19 56.55 -5.93 9.99 10.65
Lithuania 155.97 136.01 14.67 21.97 21.08
Macedonia 62.73 59.94 4.67 44.22 44.59
Montenegro 35.23 32.89 7.13 43.97 42.75
Poland 2,634.41 1,966.60 33.96 20.8 15.29
Romania 922.81 739.9 24.72 44.15 38.53
Serbia 245.14 238.5 2.79 33.96 35.84
Slovakia 290 270.56 7.18 14.59 13.4
Slovenia 225.63 220.51 2.32 11.1 11.01
Total 6,777.90 5,698.26 18.95 21.64 18.49
CEE
GWP
Change
Share to GWP
 
Until 2011, premium tariffs for compulsory motor 
insurance products in Albania were not liberalized and were 
regulated by the law of year 1992 and by the legal acts of the 
Minister of Finance, whereby for domestic TPL and border 
policies the minimum and maximum tariffs was determined 
once a year by guidance of Minister of Finance following the 
recommendations of market specialists. For the green card 
were applied fixed tariffs based on few years ago. (AMF, 
Annual Report, 2006). Subsequently, the tariff calculation for 
the MTPL products was defined in Article 10 of Law No. 
10076, dated 12.02.2009 "On compulsory insurance in the 
transport sector". Although the insurance market was well-
regulated, it still displayed problems, as the insurance 
companies attempted to sell TPL policies below the allowed 
tariffs. 
The Regulation of the MTPL tariffs causes market 
distortions, both in terms of company profitability and quality 
of services. In the case of regulated tariffs, a government may 
fail to adapt these tariffs to the risk, as tariffs are perceived by 
the consumer more as a tax rather than as benefit. The state 
intends to keep the premiums as low as possible in order to 
reduce the number of uninsured people. (Tomeski 2012). Other 
reasons why mandatory and regulated tariffs may be below the 
real premium lie in the fact that these tariffs are not updated 
regularly, they do not consider inflation and it is technically 
difficult for the government to set a fair premium. In this way, 
insurance companies try to fill this deficit by delaying the 
process of claim settlement. There is a clear correlation 
between low premiums imposed by law and the process of 
claim settlement. (World Bank, 2009). 
Despite the problems of tariff regulation, the liberalization 
is also accompanied by problems and can lead to market 
failures and distortions, if this liberalization is premature. The 
main challenge of switching from a regulated tariff system to a 
liberalized system is a right and prudent pricing of the 
products. (Tomeski, 2012). The basic principle of insurance is 
that the paid premium should be sufficient to cover the 
expected claims, other administrative costs and provide a profit 
margin as well. Thus, an insurer survives only if it sets 
appropriate tariffs for the insurance risk he has taken. 
The liberalization of mandatory motor insurance premium 
tariffs in Albania was undertaken in August 2011 with the 
entry into force of Law No. 10455, dated 21.7.2011 "On 
Amendments to Law No. 10 076, dated 12.2.2009" On 
compulsory insurance in the transport sector ". Article 10, point 
2 of this law stipulates that "the insurance company shall 
determine the insurance premium tariffs themselves, in 
accordance to the market conditions, and begin to apply them, 
after informing the Albanian Financial Supervisory Authority. 
Notwithstanding the insurance companies should have 
technical reserves and provisions, not less than the level of 
technical reserves and provisions determined by the 
Authority." Thus, AFSA intervenes only if the applied tariffs 
are under the risk premium.  
Albania liberalized MTPL tariffs before the arrival of the 
World Bank mission, which would launch in 2011 the project 
on the liberalization of compulsory motor insurance. In 
September 2011, a World Bank mission aimed at assessing 
market practices for providing MTPL related to reserving and 
pricing, claim settlements, reinsurance, and so on. It evaluated 
the database of claims used by the market for setting the 
premiums of MTPL products, and it also analyzed the 
approximation of the legal framework regulating compulsory 
motor insurance with EU directives, in order to propose 
policies and processes towards risk-based pricing of 
compulsory motor insurance products. The report of this 
mission "The Road Ahead for Albanian Motor" considered the 
liberalization of MTPL tariffs as premature. The mission stated 
that although almost every insurance company had an actuary, 
no one considered them when it came to setting premiums. 
Since insurance companies were just looking for market shares, 
they did not take the work of actuaries seriously. The Albanian 
insurance market should have gone a long way towards 
liberalization. Markets should be prepared for the shocks 
deriving from liberalization. 
Some conditions should be met before liberalization could 
take place and the market should be sufficiently mature to face 
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this liberalization. This requires sufficient actuarial expertise, a 
powerful supervisor 2  thugh some years after market 
liberalization), and sufficient customer awareness. Competitive 
behavior in the market should also be fair, there should be 
insurers' stability, technical capacity and discipline in insurance 
underwritting process as well as a compulsory motor insurance 
(claim information) database, an association of insurers with a 
degree of high self-governance and indipendence as well as an 
appropriate legal structure with a high role of courts in solving 
cases. A premature liberalized market leads to instability of the 
market as well as to the decrease of the capacity to pay claims. 
In a liberalized Albanian market it is vital that the two 
processes: the calculation of reserves and pricing should be 
supervised and function properly. These two processes are 
complementary, as an underestimation of the reserves will lead 
to a low premium estimate, affecting the low ability to pay 
future claims. 
From the countries of the region, Albania and Croatia are 
the only countries that applied the liberalization of MTPL 
product tariffs. Other countries like Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia 
and Montenegro are still characterized by the regulation of the 
MTPL tariffs. Regarding Croatia, the obligation for 
liberalization resulted from its membership in the EU on 
01.07.2013. Croatia became the 28th member of the European 
Union, and on 13.09.2017 it undertook the liberalization of 
compulsory motor insurance. It was precisely EU membership 
that created the framework to liberalize MTPL tariffs, with no 
control by the regulator. Regarding Albania, it would have 
been more advisable for it to undertake a gradual liberalization, 
with a preliminary preparation, such as Montenegro. 
Montenegro decided for a gradual liberalization of the market. 
Law No.44 "On compulsory insurance in the transport sector" 
of 2012 stipulated a transition period of five years from a 
regulated to a liberal market, which means that insurance 
companies will acquire the freedom to set the tariffs by 
themselves only after 5 years, thus in 2017. Also in the law of 
year 2012 it was decided that the minimum limits of liabilities 
would rise from 150 thousand Euros to 550 Euros in 2015 for 
personal injuries, while for material damages this limit would 
be raised from 80 thousand Euros to 300 thousand Euro. 
The process of liberalization tariffs in Albania and the 
region ocurred in the framework of the need to comply with the 
European Motor Insurance Directives, especially with the third 
directive, which confirms the freedom of setting premiums 
from insurance companies. Liberalization in Europe took place 
in 1994 under the European directive "Freedom to Provide 
Services and Right of Establishment". The creation of a 
common insurance market in the EU took around 30 years. The 
first initiative to integrate the European insurance markets took 
place in 1970 and ended in 1994. The Third European 
Directive no. 92/49 / EEC and 92/96 / EEC of life and non-life 
insurance established the basis for the creation of a common 
European insurance market. The first Generation of Insurance 
Directives in the 1970’s was the first liberalization step, where 
insurance companies could establish branches but with the 
                                                          
2
 AFSA became an indipendend institution reporting to the Albanian 
Parliament only in 2014, three years after the liberalization of MTPL premium 
tariffs. 
control and permission of local regulatory authorities. The 
second generation of directives, which entered into force in 
1988 and 1990, enabled European companies, also based on 
the principle of freedom of services, to offer their services to 
another country without the need to establishing branches. 
However, many restrictions remained. The highest stage in the 
creation of the Single European Insurance Market was the 
Third Generation of Insurance Directives, with the law that 
came into force on 1 July 1994, which foresaw the abolition of 
state intervention in market regulation. The Third Generation 
of Insurance Directives envisaged three principles: the 
principle of the Single European Insurance License, where by 
obtaining a license in their country, insurance companies are 
granted the right, even without the permission of the authorities 
of other countries, to operate in another EU country. The 
second principle related to the Home Country Control, 
according to which insurance companies are subject to 
oversight of their home authorities, regardless of where they 
operate in the EU. The third principle referred to the focus on 
solvency supervision.(Sterzynski, 2003). The Fourth Directive 
provided the procedures for accidents occurring abroad and the 
establishment of a national vehicle registration system as well 
as the limitation of liabilities.The Fifth Directive increased the 
minimum amounts of liability and restructured the procedures 
for damages abroad.  
The time period for the introduction of tariff liberalization 
in European countries has been different. Thus in France the 
free tariff regime has been applied since 1986, many years 
before the European directive on liberalization. In Spain, the 
freedom to set premiums in the insurance sector was provided 
in August 1984. In Germany the tariffs were regulated until 
1994 and their full liberalization was only completed in 1994. 
Italy was one of the last Western European countries moving 
towards liberalization in pursuance of the European Directive 
of 1994. Until this year the tariff structure was the same for all 
companies (World Bank, 2009). Austria experienced the 
liberalization in the 1980s, while Slovenia in 1997. The 
decision on the liberalization of the EU insurance market on 
July 1, 1994 was taken in favor of the consumer.  
 
IV. EFFECTS OF THE MTPL TARIFFS LIBERALIZATION  
 
Following the abolition of fixed tariffs in 2011 in Albania, 
mandatory motor insurance premiums have undergone constant 
fluctuations. The main trend has been the reduction of these 
tariffs. However after the sharp drop of the premium level, over 
the years 2011 to 2013, it was recorded an increase in 2014, 
from 55 Euros in 2013 to 94 Euros in 2014, and an increase by 
about 20% in August 2016. Also on 1 February 2012, the 
Competition Authority found the existence of an agreement 
between several insurance companies and decided to fine them.  
In 2014, as a result of premium growth, gross written 
premiums in Albania grew by about 36.9%, while in 2016 
gross written premiums increased by 9.64% compared to the 
previous year.  
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Table 3: Fluctuations in average premiums in compulsory motor insurance in 
Albania (in Euro) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
48 64 80 75 60 70 55 94 103 112  
Macedonia has shown a stable trend of premium tariffs at 
the level of 90 Euros, 88 Euros and 88 Euro respectively in 
2012, 2013 and 2014. 
The effects of liberalization are closely related to a drop in 
the premium level and a rise in the combined ratio. For 
highlighting these effects, we can refer to the case of Croatia, 
where after the liberalization premiums decreased by about 
18.51% from 392 million Euros in 2013 to 320 million Euros 
in year 2014. Before liberalization, Croatia had one of the 
highest average MTPL tariffs in the region. As a result of EU 
membership and tariff liberalization in 2013, the average 
premium level declined by 26% within one single year, from 
about € 200 to around € 150, reflecting the intensification of 
competition. As a result, the combined ratio increased from 
83.8% in 2012 to 90.3% in 2014. According to a survey of the 
Competition Authority in Croatia, the liberalization of the 
MTPL market in Croatia has brought benefits. According to 
this survey, the market is liberalized and well-structured so that 
consumers have better choices compared with some years ago. 
One of the main changes in MTPL tariffs in Croatia was the 
abolition of pricing criteria, which affected the road carriers of 
different regions as some carriers registered in some regions of 
the country paid more than the vehicles registered in another 
region. Thus instead of premium segmentation by region, 
insurance companies decided to apply uniform pricing policies 
for the entire territory. As a result, motor vehicles registered in 
the Zagreb area for example, which previously paid the double 
MTPL tariffs compared to other regions, showed a significant 
decrease in their insurance costs. The Competition Authority in 
Croatia welcomed this fact and considered the discrimination 
of vehicles by region of registration as unlogical. (Xprimm, 
19.01.2017). 
Table 4: Premium Fluctuations in Croatia (in Euro) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
156 166 168 169 184 190 193 195 197 198 199 157 
Source: InsuranceEurope, 2015 
The experience of the liberalization process in some 
industrialized countries showed another trend. Tariffs increased 
directly after their liberalization, such as in Italy, which after 
the liberalization in 1994 experienced an increase of the tariffs. 
In the years before and immediately after liberalization, 
premium growth followed the trend of the claim increase. 
Mandatory motor insurance tariffs, which in Italy have been 
mandatory since 1968 were designated until 1994 by the so-
called Price Committee, which was gathered annually to 
determine these tariffs based on the recommendations of the 
expert commission (Philippine Committee). Before 1994, 
premiums did not respond to inflation and were growing more 
than inflation. Italy's motor insurance situation changed 
considerably before and after 1994. It was thought that the 
third EU directive would stabilize the premium level in the 
market, but the market did not have positive developments 
even before liberalization and was not in good condition 
bringing unexpected results. The tariffs increased considerably. 
From 1980 to 1994 they increased by over 4 Euros per year, 
while in the period 1994 to 2004 to 11 Euros per year. The 
growth of premiums came as a result of many factors such as 
the increased number of vehicles, high insured amounts, 
increased frequency of fraud, etc. To stabilize the market, in 
2000 the Italian government tried to enforce the antitrust 
regulation and a tariff freeze. Antitrust law violations were 
found as a result of agreements between 39 companies out of 
81 existing companies. This agreement was considered a 
contributor to the significant premium growth. For this reason 
the premiums did not undergo full competition and there was a 
drop in the products supply. Freezing premium tariffs was 
another way for the government to control the premiums. This 
measure prevented further increases in premiums, but caused a 
violation of the third European directive. The Association of 
Italian Insurers (ANIA) sent the case to the European Court, as 
the third directive promotes competition and does not allow the 
government to restrict competition. The Court concluded that 
the freezing of premiums was in breach of the directive. 
(Heikes, 2006). 
A similar situation appeared recently in Romania, where 
the Romanian government imposed the ceiling of a maximum 
MTPL tariff, thus not complying with the EU and Solvency II 
rules. The decision became effective on 17 November 2016. 
These maximum premiums would be applied for a period of 6 
months. The European Commission didn’t support this 
decision. 
Although Albania has liberalized tariffs in comparison to 
the other countries in the region, it should be noted that the 
Bonus-Malus system, which is thought to bring stability to the 
insurance market, is applicable in these countries, while in 
Albania it is not yet implemented. Kosovo applies the Bonus-
Malus system since 2013, Serbia since 2011, Montenegro since 
February 2015, and Macedonia since 2006. 
 
V. BONUS-MALUS SYSTEM: SOME CALCULATIONS OF THE 
EFFECTTIVENESS OF THE BONUS-MALUS SYSTEM IN 
ALBANIA  
The European liberalization rule raised concerns as it was 
considered a threat to the Bonus-Malus system, a system 
applied in all European Union countries, while in Albania it is 
expected to be applied starting from January 2018. As 
mentioned above, the countries of the region have already 
introduced this system. The main goal of the Bonus-Malus 
system is to reduce the number of accidents. In 1980 the claims 
frequency in Europe was 15%, in 2008 it decreased to about 
9%. There is still a downward trend of this frequency in 
Europe. (Insurance Europe, 2016). 
Even though after July 1, 1994, no unified Bonus-Malus 
system could be proposed, this did not constitute a risk for the 
european countries to continue to use their systems that differ 
in form and manner of functioning in the european market. 
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Without a unified Bonus-Malus system in Europe, 
discriminatory situations may arise. If for example, a person 
who has been living in Germany for 25 years without causing 
any damage during these years, receives a job offer in another 
EU country, for example Italy, then he will seek for a cheap 
insurance in the new state where he is displaced. In Italy he can 
pay more than in Germany. The reason lies in the fact that 
insurance can be more expensive in Italy, but also because not 
all the claim free years in Germany could be recognized in 
Italy but only for example five years. So, if he was in the best 
Bonus class in Germany, in Italy he would only be categorized 
in a higher class paying much more than in Germany. 
The question that arises is whether, when paying higher 
premiums as a result of the categorization in the Malus classes, 
it will incent the insured to be more carefull or the insured 
person will hesitate to report the claims in order to belong to a 
lower class leading to a lower claims frequency although this 
frequency has not decreased in reality. This phenomenon in 
literature is known as "Hunger for Bonus" and may be one of 
the issues that will arise from the implementation of the Bonus-
Malus system in Albania. Bonus-Hunger is the tendency of a 
policyholder to not report the small claims and to bear them 
themselves in order to avoid future costs associated with the 
categorization to a higher class of Malus. (Ragnar, 1975). 
Another problem that may arise during the implementation 
of Bonus-Malus is the increase of premiums as in the case of 
Serbia's experience. In Serbia, the companies set MTPL 
premiums under Bonus-Malus, but the minimum premium is 
set by the Serbian Association of Insurers and is approved by 
the Serbian National Bank. In July 2014 the premium tariff 
increased on average by 40%, from 77 Euros in 2013 to 88 
Euros in 2014. This was the second increase after that of year 
2008. The reason for the increase was the decrease of the 
premium volume due to the introduction of the Bonus-Malus 
system in 2011, as only 1% of policyholders belonged to Malus 
classes. This experience should be taken into consideration 
even in the case of the introduction of Bonus-Malus in Albania. 
In literature, the elasticity coefficient serves as a measure of 
the Bonus-Malus system efficiency. This coefficient was 
introduced for the first time by Loimaranta (1972). The 
elasticity coefficient measures the ability of the Bonus-Malus 
system to respond to claim changes. In other words it means 
how premiums react when the claim frequency changes. 
Elasticity usually takes values from 0 to 1. None of the Bonus-
Malus systems has elasticity equal to 1. 
As in the case of Serbia, our calculations show a premium 
decrease as a result of the fact that the percentage of people 
who will be in the Bonus classes will be higher than the 
population in the Malus classes. This can also lead to increased 
premium tariffs but also to increased fraud in order to benefit 
from the bonus classes.  
To calculate the elasticity in the case of Albania we built a 
model based on Loimaranta (1972). Similar studies for other 
countries were undertaken by Leimar (1998), (Kafkova, 2015), 
Chen / Li (2014), De Pril (1978), (Mahmoundvand et al 2013), 
(Whitehead, 1991), Baione et. al (2002), (Topolwksi/ 
Bernardelli, 2017). 
The main formula for calculating elasticity is: 
 
                        Ƞ (



/
)(/)(
)
d
pdp
                                (1) 
 
where Ƞ is marked as elasticity,   is the claim frequency 
and p expresses the premium paid. In this way, elasticity 
indicates how much the premium changes when the frequency 
of damages changes. Normally the premium must change as 
much as the claim frequency, but this does not happen in any 
country applying the Bonus-Malus system. The highest 
elasticity found is the Swiss one at 0.4 (Leimar, 1998). 
The model suggests that claims follow the Poisson 
distribution. This distribution shows the probability of a certain 
number of claims according to the formula below: 
 
                                   P(X=x) =
 e
x
x
*
!
                             (2)               (2) 
 
In this way we can calculate the probabilities that one or 
more accidents may occur. 
Recognizing the fact that the Albanian Bonus-Malus 
system has 18 classes, we create a matrix with 18 variables. 
Below is the Bonus-Malus system that is thought to be 
introduced in Albania, according to the Italian system. 
 
Class/Nu
mber Of  
Claims
0 1 2 3 4                    Price Coefficient r(i)
1 1 3 6 9 12 50%
2 1 4 7 10 13 53%
3 2 5 8 11 14 56%
4 3 6 9 12 15 59%
5 4 7 10 13 16 62%
6 5 8 11 14 17 66%
7 6 9 12 15 18 70%
8 7 10 13 16 18 74%
9 8 11 14 17 18 78%
10 9 12 15 18 18 82%
11 10 13 16 18 18 88%
12 11 14 17 18 18 94%
13 12 15 18 18 18 100%
14 13 16 18 18 18 115%
15 14 17 18 18 18 130%
16 15 18 18 18 18 150%
17 16 18 18 18 18 175%
18 17 18 18 18 18 200%  
 
Leimar (1995) describes the Bonus-Malus systems in 
several countries, such as in Germany, which applies 22 
classes, in Italy, which moved from a system with 13 classes 
moved to the 18 class system etc.  
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Given the above matrix for the case of Albania, we have 
solved the so-called Transition Matrix of Markov. This matrix 
shows us the probabilities of moving from one class to another. 
For the calculation of such matrix the claim frequency 
according to the Posison distribution and the average claim 
frequency are required. In the case of Albania we take an 
average claim frequency equal to 3%. This claim frequency is 
low due to a low claim reporting. In Italy the claim frequency 
is about 6%, in Germany it is 8%. (InsuranceEurope, 2016). 
 
The following transition matrix of Markov has resulted 
from our calculatios: 
M_matrix 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
1 0.970446 0 0.029113 0 0 0.000437 0 0 4.367E-06 0 0 3.27525E-08 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0.970446 0 0 0.029113 0 0 0.000437 0 0 4.367E-06 0 0 3.27525E-08 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0.970446 0 0 0.029113 0 0 0.000437 0 0 4.367E-06 0 0 3.27525E-08 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0.970446 0 0 0.029113 0 0 0.0004367 0 0 4.367E-06 0 0 3.27525E-08 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0.970446 0 0 0.029113 0 0 0.0004367 0 0 4.367E-06 0 0 3.27525E-08 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0.970446 0 0 0.029113 0 0 0.0004367 0 0 4.367E-06 0 0 3.27525E-08 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0.970446 0 0 0.0291134 0 0 0.0004367 0 0 4.367E-06 0 0 3.27525E-08
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.970446 0 0 0.0291134 0 0 0.0004367 0 0 4.367E-06 0 3.27525E-08
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.970446 0 0 0.0291134 0 0 0.0004367 0 0 4.367E-06 3.27525E-08
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9704455 0 0 0.029113366 0 0 0.0004367 0 0 4.39976E-06
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9704455 0 0 0.029113366 0 0 0.0004367 0 4.39976E-06
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9704455 0 0 0.029113366 0 0 0.0004367 4.39976E-06
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.970445534 0 0 0.029113366 0 0 0.0004411
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.970445534 0 0 0.029113366 0 0.0004411
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.970445534 0 0 0.029113366 0.0004411
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.970445534 0 0 0.029554466
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.970445534 0 0.029554466
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.970445534 0.029554466 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
After finding the transition matrix of Markov, we found the 
so-called stationary probability distribution vector of the 
Markov Chain, which shows the percentage of people who will 
persistently stay in the same class of Bonus-Malus system. The 
sum of this vector terms equals to 1. This is also the condition 
to solve the linear system with 18 variables. If ai  stays for  the 
stable vector, while the matrix is M, then the linear equation 
system required to be solved  is: 
 
M*ai=ai, when it is known that a1+a2+………..a18=1. 
 
We solved this system using the solver program in Excel and 
the vector results for a 3% claim frequency are as follows: 
a1= 0.93767386, a2= 0.02855642, a3= 0.029426093, a4= 
0.002192035, a5= 0.0014021, a6= 0.000562017, a7= 9.1419E-
05, a8= 3.92898E-05, a9= 1.0384E-05, a10= 6.9713E-06, a11= 
5.37397E-06, a12= 4.9732E-06, a13= 4.87438E-06, a14= 
4.84393E-06, a15= 4.83758E-06, a16= 4.83554E-06, a17= 
4.83507E-06, a18= 4.83495E-06 
Multiplying the coefficients found with the premium 
coefficients applied to a particular class of Bonus-Malus and 
by adding the results, it comes out the average stationary 
premium level, which in the case of Albania results is 50.31for 
a claim frequency of 3%. This low value indicates a smooth 
transition of the Bonus-Malus system. The result shows that the 
major part of the policyholders will be in the low classes of the 
Bonus-Malus system. The elasticity according to the elasticity 
formula for a claim frequency of 3% results to be low at a 
value of 0.07. The elasticity curve (Loimaranta Elasticity) for 
Albania is presented as follows: 
Figure II: Loimaranta elasticity for Albania 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
To compare the elasticity values of Albania with other 
Bonus-Malus systems, we take also the calculated elasticities 
for the United Kingdom and the Swiss system. The results are 
presented below: 
 
Figure III.  Comparison of  Loimaranta Elasticity 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
As it can be seen, the Swiss system turns out to be more 
efficient. For a claim frequency of up to 0.2, the Albanian 
Bonus-Malus system turns out to be more elastic than the 
British one. The elasticity reaches the value close to 1 only for 
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very high and unusual values of claim frequency. The Swiss 
system for values of claim frequency up to 0.28 reaches an 
elasticity value above 1. Even for the Albanian case it is found 
a high elasticity especially for the claim frequency between 
15% and 20%. For low levels of claim frequency the elasticity 
of the Albanian Bonus-Malus System is lower than in 
Switzerland and in United Kingdom. 
Considering the stationary premium, which is around 50%, 
it can be said that the good risks will continue to subsidize the 
bad risks. About 99% of policyholders end up in the first 
classes and will benefit from the minimum premium, while a 
small fraction of less than 1% will end up in the Malus classes, 
indicating that the system penalties are not too high. 
An optimal Bonus-Malus system is financially balanced, 
with a stationary premium of 100 every year, but it has the 
disadvantage that the penalties are high and encourages an 
increase of the uninsured number. (Constantinescu 2017). 
However the level of penalties and the severity of a Bonus-
Malus system are also related to the country's economic 
development, but empirical studies show also a correlation 
between the culture and the implementation of this system. 
Referring to the fact that the developed countries apply tougher 
systems (Park et al. (2010), it would have been better to 
implement in Albania a simpler system with less classes. 
Albania should undertake an awareness campaign before 
implementation. Future studies may consider the performance 
of insurance companies' financial balance as a result of the 
Bonus-Malus implementation. 
CONCLUSION 
The openness of the insurance market in Albania positively 
effected the development of the market. Foreign investors 
showed interest for the insurance sector. The results of this 
study show a positive correlation between liberalization of the 
market, foreign capital and the profitability of the companies. 
Nevertheless, the liberalization of the MTPL premium tariffs in 
2011 was associated with a market instability and premium 
fluctuations. In this regard we suggest the introduction of 
premium caps for a certain period.  Our results show that the 
implementation of Bonus-Malus system could stabilize the 
market but it can also be associated with a drecrease of claims 
reporting. The Bonus-Malus system should be simpler and with 
less classes then the system which is  intended to be 
implemented according to the Italian one.  
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